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The Political Functions of Independent Commissions: 
Comparing UK Commissions on Migrant Integration 
and Cohesion1 
 
Abstract 
UK governments have frequently set up commissions to produce reports on complex 
policy problems, especially following ‘crisis’ focusing events. Such commissions are ad 
hoc, limited in duration, and engage external actors in providing policy advice and 
expertise to governments. This problem-solving, or instrumental function, is prominent 
in the literature: commissions are valued as a means of producing useful knowledge to 
inform policy responses. However, we believe that the problem-solving rationale does 
not adequately explain the decision to set up a commission, given the additional 
resources required, and the risk that governments take in allowing quasi-independent 
bodies to produce recommendations. Instead, we argue that the value of commissions 
may lie as much in their symbolic functions as their problem-solving ones: they are 
valued for their capacity to signal that governments are taking appropriate action to 
address policy problems. This article will explore how important these different 
functions have been with regard to integration policies for migrants and ethnic 
minorities, comparing three commissions which reported since 2000: the Commission 
on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000), the Community Cohesion Review Team 
(2001), and the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007). 
 
                                                 
1 This research was funded by the Volkswagen Foundation, as part of the project on “Science-Society 
Dialogues on Immigrant Integration”, coordinated by Erasmus University Rotterdam.   
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1.  Introduction 
Governments frequently set up commissions to produce reports on complex policy 
problems, especially following “crisis” focusing events (Boin et al. 2008; McConnell 
2003; Resodihardjo 2006). Literature on independent commissions has primarily 
focused on Anglophone countries (Chapman1973, Cartwright 1975, Lipsky and Olson 
1977, Iacobucci 1989), but attention has increasingly been paid to expert committees in 
a diverse set of polities (Bunwaree et al. 2005, Marier 2009, Schneider and Scholten 
forthcoming). Commissions typically take the form of ad hoc bodies, established for a 
limited time, with the task of providing policy advice to governments. Importantly, 
commissions engage a wider set of actors beyond those normally involved in 
policymaking (Cartwright 1975): members may include practitioners, researchers, and 
representatives of civil society groups. They are granted a more or less autonomous 
status, being mandated to engage in a process of information-gathering, analysis and 
debate with the aim of producing recommendations. 
 
Clearly, then, the decision to establish a commission indicates both a willingness to 
commit additional resources to a problem, and a readiness to cede a certain degree of 
control over the outcome of the commission’s deliberations. This raises the obvious 
question of why governments would want to pursue this route. Framed in the context of 
this special issue, what are the political uses of commissions, including as part of a 
response to crisis? Recent contributions have focused on the contribution of 
commissions to policy learning: they are valued as a means of producing knowledge to 
inform policy responses (Rowe and McAllister 2006, Marier 2009). Indeed this 
problem-solving function tends to be the rationale explicitly given by governments to 
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justify setting up a commission (see, for example, Lord Rothschild 1978, in Bulmer 
1981). 
 
However, we believe that the problem-solving rationale does not adequately explain the 
decision to set up a commission, given the potential costs mentioned above. Instead, we 
argue that the value of commissions may lie as much in their symbolic functions: their 
capacity to signal that governments are taking appropriate action to address policy 
problems. We divide this symbolic function into two types: substantiating and 
legitimising. Commissions play a substantiating function where they provide evidence 
or support for the government’s preferred course of action. And they play a legitimising 
role where they help signal that the government is taking appropriate action to address 
a problem.  
 
This article will explore how important these different functions have been in the case 
of commissions on immigrant integration. The area of immigrant integration 
incorporates race relations, community cohesion and citizenship acquisition. 
Commissions or inquiries in this area have a long history in the United Kingdom.2 We 
focus on the more recent past, comparing three commissions3 which reported after 
2000: the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain in 2000 (CMEB), chaired by 
Professor Bhikhu Parekh; the Community Cohesion Review Team (CCRT) in 2001, 
chaired by Ted Cantle; and the Commission on Integration and Cohesion in 2007 (CIC), 
chaired by Darra Singh. 
                                                 
2 For example, the Scarman Inquiry, 1981; the Swann Report,1985; and the Macpherson Inquiry, 1999. 
3 Despite lacking the word ‘commission’ in its title, the CCRT functioned very much as a commission 
according to generic definitions. As Chapman (1973: 9) notes, “although particular institutions may be 
called, for example, Royal Commissions, Commissions, Committees, or Working Parties, there is in 
practice little difference between them.” 
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We explore the different rationales that shaped the establishment and denouement of 
commissions. Were the commissions valued for their problem-solving, substantiating, 
or legitimising functions? We also examine a second question of how far these initial 
intentions were subsequently met. In many cases, the work of commissions may prove 
to be more or less useful to governments than expected. Governments and other actors 
may identify new and unanticipated uses for commissions as their deliberations unfold, 
or once recommendations have been made. Alternatively, commissions may become a 
liability over time as they produce embarrassing findings or receive negative media 
coverage. It may therefore be the case that the functions of commissions change over 
time, from their establishment through to the dissemination of their reports and their 
subsequent influence on debates. We will therefore enquire into the initial purpose of 
setting up the commission; and how, if at all, this purpose changed over time. 
 
Our comparative analysis of the three commissions draws on a combination of content 
analysis (commission reports, press releases, media coverage, official responses) and 16 
in-depth interviews with commission chairs, members, and those in government most 
closely involved with commissions (around 25% of participants). In the next section we 
develop some ideas about the different functions of commissions for governments, 
focusing in particular on the neglected question of their symbolic uses.  Given the 
methodological challenges in distinguishing between these different functions, we also 
set out a number of indicators which can help identify instances in which commissions 
are being set up or supported to fulfil these respective functions. Section three presents 
findings from the analysis of the three commissions.  
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2. The Functions of Commissions 
 
Most of the literature on commissions notes their problem-solving role, indeed this 
function is often incorporated into the very definition of commissions. As Martin Bulmer 
writes, for example, the term ‘commission’ refers to “special ad hoc bodies set up to 
advise on specific policy problems” (Bulmer 1981: 377). Similarly, Patrik Marier defines 
commissions as “any working group created and mandated by a government to study a 
particular policy and/or program” (Marier 2009: 1206). This encapsulates a 
technocratic view of commissions, according to which “government is in doubt as to 
how an issue should be resolved; if a convincingly argued solution is put forward, the 
government will adopt it as policy” (Bulmer 1983: 436).  
 
This problem-solving understanding of commissions echoes mainstream accounts of 
how governments make use of expert knowledge in policy-making. Such analyses have 
emphasised the problem-solving function of research, which is valued by governments 
as a means of adjusting policy, in order to achieve specified policy goals (McNamara 
1998, Walsh 2000). On these accounts, the main debate revolves around whether or not 
research is taken up and used in this instrumental way: the dependent variable is use of 
research to adjust policy.  
 
A number of contributions on the sociology of knowledge utilisation, have questioned 
this rather linear problem-solving account. And these critiques, we argue, are just as 
valid for theories of the uses of commissions. Carole Weiss (1986) challenged the notion 
that research fed into policy in a direct, linear way, instead suggesting that it was far 
more likely to influence policy indirectly, by gradually chipping away at dominant ways 
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of constructing policy issues. She termed this form of influence the “enlightenment” 
function of knowledge. Meanwhile, a number of sociologists and public policy theorists 
have developed a more radical critique of instrumental accounts, suggesting that 
research may also be playing more symbolic functions. They have argued that expert 
knowledge can be valued not just as a means of adjusting policy, but also as a way of 
substantiating pre-given policy choices (Nordlinger 1981, Pfeffer 1981, Author ref); or 
in order to legitimise the credibility of policymakers (Sabatier 1978, Author ref).  
 
We believe that these two symbolic functions of research are likely to apply par 
excellence to the functions of commissions. First, commissions can provide arguments or 
evidence that help substantiate already preferred courses of action. Governments can 
structure commissions in such a way that they deliver the ‘right’ types of messages, 
findings or recommendations, which in turn help validate controversial decisions 
(Rhodes 1975; Rowe and McAllister 2006: 99). This does not necessarily imply that 
governments always have precise and well developed ideas about which course of 
action they would like to follow. It may be that they favour a general approach or set of 
priorities that they trust the commission to elaborate in the right direction. But the 
point is that they are expecting the commission to broadly back up a preferred 
approach. 
 
Second, we argue that setting up and supporting a commission can help signal that a 
government is taking action to address a problem, and that it is drawing on the best 
available expertise and evidence to do so. In this sense, commissions can play a 
legitimising role, signalling to observers that an issue is being taken seriously, even if in 
practice there is no adjustment of policy. Indeed, this idea of signalling that government 
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is taking action resonates with the idea of commissions as a “delaying tactic”, a tendency 
which has been identified in the literature on commissions but not fully explored 
(Cartwright 1975, McConnell 2003, Rowe and McAllister 2009: 102).  
 
Under what conditions might we expect commissions to perform these different 
functions? First, the problem-solving function of commissions would be most likely to 
be relevant where the agency establishing the commission recognises it has gaps in its 
knowledge, and considers that a commission will be an appropriate means for 
delivering the required expertise or evidence. In other words, policymakers 
acknowledge there are limitations in their understanding of the problem and how to 
rectify it. By contrast, the legitimising function is more likely to be important in cases 
where governments are concerned about demonstrating their capacity to address 
problems. In such contexts, policymakers are likely to rely less on substantive 
adjustments to output, opting instead for more symbolic actions to secure support for 
their policy: rhetoric, or formal structures (Scott and Meyer 1991, Brunnson 2002). 
Finally, the substantiating function is likely to prevail in situations where policy is 
highly contested. Policymakers are keen to draw on evidence to support their 
preferences. And invoking expert knowledge or arguments produced by a respected 
commission may be seen as a good means of substantiating their chosen course of 
action.  
 
Indicators 
 
While it is relatively straightforward to distinguish analytically between these different 
functions, it is more challenging to identify them in practice. Policymakers will tend to 
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fall back on instrumental narratives to explain the functions of commissions; indeed, as 
Nils Brunsson has argued, such narratives are often crucial for sustaining motivation 
and legitimacy within an organisation (Brunsson 2002: 7). So how can we design our 
data collection and analysis in a way that avoids simply reproducing the narratives of 
policymakers? 
 
We would like to suggest a number of indicators that can help gauge the functions of 
commissions, in a way that provides a form of “check” or validation independent of the 
self-adopted narratives of policymakers. These indicators are all linked to features of 
commissions, and the interaction between commissions and policymakers. They are 
loosely based on [author’s] indicators for the different functions of research in 
policymaking (Author ref), but adjusted to capture the particular features of 
commissions. 
 
Composition. A first indicator is the commission’s composition, which provides useful 
insights into how policymakers view its anticipated usefulness. Where the commission 
is valued for its instrumental function, we would expect the commission to be chaired 
by/composed of those experts deemed best qualified to fill gaps in knowledge. By 
contrast, if the commission is valued for its substantiating function, we would expect 
governments to ensure it is chaired by/composed of, people who are trusted to deliver 
recommendations in line with government preferences. Finally, if the commission is 
valued for its legitimising role, we would expect its chair and composition to be figures 
considered authoritative in their field, thereby lending weight to the commission. 
 
  
8 
Resources and timeframe. Second, where a commission is seen as performing an 
instrumental role, we would expect it to be allocated sufficient time and resources to 
produce valid findings. Where it is valued for its substantiating function, we might 
expect a greater interest in an expedited commission to produce findings in a timely 
way in order to support the government’s preferred course of action. In the case of 
legitimising knowledge, there will be less interest in swift outcomes – indeed, it may be 
in the interest of the government to defer the commission’s report as part of a delaying 
tactic. There may also be less interest in investing substantial resources, beyond the 
need to signal it is taking the question seriously. 
 
Independence. A third indicator is the degree of independence accorded the commission 
in respect of its terms of reference, and its margin of manoeuvre in subsequent 
deliberations and the drafting of its report. Where the commission is valued for its 
instrumental function, we would expect it to be allowed to operate relatively 
independently of government, with the proviso that its work remains relevant to the 
problem at hand. In the case of the substantiating function, we would expect the 
commission to be more tightly controlled by government, both in its terms of reference 
and subsequent activities. In the case of the legitimising function, we would expect the 
commission to have a high degree of independence, both to signal its credibility as an 
independent body, and also because the government has less interest in the substantive 
findings of the report. However, such independence is not limitless: sponsoring 
departments will be wary of being inadvertently embarrassed by a commission’s 
proposals. 
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Dissemination. The fourth indicator concerns the government’s interest in publicising 
the establishment and workings of the commission, and its findings. Where the 
commission is valued for its instrumental function, policymakers will be less concerned 
about such publicity, as the main purpose of the commission is to produce findings to 
adjust policy. In the case of the substantiating function, we would expect policymakers 
to selectively publicise the findings of the commission, to support their arguments. Such 
publicity may involve a high profile launch of the report to ensure maximum impact of 
its findings. In the case of the legitimising function, we would expect policymakers to be 
less concerned about dissemination of the specific findings, and more interested in 
publicising the existence, composition, and workings of the commission as a means of 
signalling its credibility.  
 
Government take-up. The final indicator concerns how far the government does in fact 
make use of the commission’s findings to adjust policy. If the Commission is playing an 
problem-solving function, we would expect its findings to be used to adjust policy. If its 
function is primarily substantiating, its findings would be used to bolster already 
favoured courses of action. If it is valued as a means of bestowing legitimacy, there 
would be limited takeup of the Commission’s findings. It should be noted that there may 
well be a discrepancy between the government’s initial expectations about the 
usefulness of the commission’s findings, and how useful they turn out to be in practice. 
We should also note that the influence of a commission may either be bolstered or 
discredited depending on how it is received in the mass media. For this reason, this fifth 
indicator is more a measure of how the government makes use of the commission’s 
findings at the end of the process; it cannot tell us much about the government’s initial 
intention in setting up the commission.  
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The five indicators are summarised in Table 1. 
 
< Insert Table 1 about here. > 
 
In what follows, we apply these indicators to explore the functions of commissions 
through a comparative analysis of three cases. All three commissions cover the area of 
immigrant integration and inter-ethnic relations, allowing us to (at least partially) 
control for differences in the functions of commissions across policy sectors. All three 
were set up in the 2000s, under the Labour administration led by Tony Blair – again, 
allowing us to compare commissions under similar conditions of government ideology 
and leadership style. However, beyond these similarities the three commissions display 
important variations across the dimensions set out in the indicators above: in terms of 
their composition, terms of reference, resources, timeframe, approach to dissemination, 
and how far the government made use of their findings. Importantly, the commissions 
also vary in the level of government involvement in their set-up and funding: the CCRT 
and CIC were government-sponsored commissions, whereas the Commission on the 
Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain was established by the Runnymede Trust – though with 
strong backing and various forms of involvement from senior Labour Party and 
government figures.  
 
3. Three Commissions Compared 
 
Commissions on integration in the UK have tended to be established in the aftermath of 
dramatic ‘focusing’ events. Two of the inquiries we study follow this pattern. The 
Community Cohesion Review Team (CCRT) was set up following public disturbances in 
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the summer of 2001 affecting several English towns: Bradford, Burnley and Oldham. 
The riots were some of the worst seen in the UK for at least 20 years, with around 400 
arrests, over 400 police officers injured, and damages was estimated at £10 million 
(Home Office 2001). 
 
The origins of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) can be traced to the 
government’s early response to the terrorist attacks in London on July 7, 2005. Tony 
Blair quickly announced the creation of a Muslim Taskforce to combat the spread of 
Islamic extremism. As one response to the Taskforce’s deliberations, Home Secretary 
Charles Clarke announced a Commission on Integration and Cohesion. This was framed 
as an opportunity to hold a ‘national conversation’4 about the broad role of faith – and 
not just Islam – in British society: the subsequent careers of Clarke and Blair indicate 
that they considered this to be a ‘legacy’ issue.5 However, a reorganisation of Whitehall 
in 2006 led to the commission being passed over to the newly-created Department for 
Communities and Local Government, headed by Ruth Kelly. The commission’s remit 
shifted accordingly, to focus on issues of integration and cohesion in local areas where 
established ethnic minorities and/or new migrant communities resided.  
 
By contrast, the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB), which 
convened between 1998 and 2000, was initially conceived by the Runnymede Trust 
think-tank as a sequel to the highly influential report Colour and Citizenship (Rose 
1969), one of the founding documents of British race relations and a major inspiration 
for legislation of the time. Like the CIC, though, the CMEB was also delayed by a ‘false 
                                                 
4 Interview with a senior civil servant. 
5 Clarke is Visiting Professor in Religion and Faith at Lancaster University; Blair set up his Faith 
Foundation in 2008. 
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start’. Although originally the inspiration of Professor Bhikhu Parekh and Trevor 
Phillips, then chair of Runnymede, Parekh himself was not the trustees’ first choice as 
chair of the commission. Instead, Sir John Burgh, a former senior civil servant, was 
brought in to chair the body. However, Burgh’s chairmanship was undone by difficulties 
in finding suitable staff and a lack of cooperation between the Trust and commissioners, 
and he resigned. Parekh was brought in to replace him and re-constitute the 
membership.6 
 
In what follows, we analyse features of the commissions in relation to the indicators set 
out above: composition, resources, dissemination, and government take-up. 
 
Composition 
 
Appointing a chair and members is an important lever which sponsors have to influence 
a commission. In the case of the CCRT, Ted Cantle was selected as a “safe pair of hands”, 
who could be trusted to deliver appropriate recommendations. Cantle was known to a 
number of ministers through his senior management roles in local government. As one 
member of the former Labour government put it: “I knew Ted … and had always been 
very impressed with him generally as an officer. (…) He would know that the ministers 
will want something they can do something with” (interview with minister). As Cantle 
himself recounted: 
[Ministers] knew me as a sort of ‘safe officer’ type person, who was capable of 
writing a report and presenting findings and so on. 
 
                                                 
6 Interview with commissioner. 
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Cantle considered that the most important attribute for CCRT members was to be “very 
clued up about policy and practice, and what levers needed to be pulled (…) [Our 
recommendations] were capable of being adopted, that was the point: we knew how to 
make them happen” (interview with Cantle). The membership was ethnically diverse, 
and also included people with various types of practical experience and expertise, 
including from the third sector, the police, trades unions, and local government. While 
none of the commissioners were academics, input from advisors with academic 
backgrounds was sought (Appendix C of the CCRT report). The choice of a trusted 
chairman, and the value attached to “making things happen”, point to a substantiating 
or problem-solving role for the CCRT. Members were not selected in order to signal the 
authority of the commission, but rather to produce politically astute recommendations 
which stood a high chance of being taken up in policymaking. 
 
Deciding the CIC’s membership, in contrast, was a very drawn-out process and much 
less straightforward, due to the ministerial upheavals described above. It is therefore 
more difficult to identify a rationale behind the selection of the commission’s chair and 
its members. Like the CCRT, a local government chief executive, Darra Singh, was named 
as chair. Singh had served on the CCRT, so was already known to policymakers in this 
field. Two academics – both with connections to the Labour party – were also invited to 
participate. 
 
The composition of the CMEB, by contrast, suggests that its sponsors and chair were 
keen to produce findings that would influence public debate and policy: commissioners 
were appointed for possessing relevant experience, be it academic- or practitioner-
based. Parekh’s team included some of the leading academics in the field, people “who I 
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thought had kept away from public life, or who were active in public life but had never 
been involved in policymaking, and I wanted to draw them in. So I wanted the best 
brains in the field of race, to think” (interview with Parekh). But including leading 
academics can also be seen as a means of ensuring the commission was seen as 
authoritative, thereby bolstering the credibility and reputation of its sponsor, the 
Runnymede Trust. Indeed, it is difficult to disentangle these instrumental and 
legitimising functions, as a more authoritative report would presumably enhance its 
influence on policy.  
 
Resources and Duration 
 
An oft-remarked issue in the literature on commissions is the lack of time or resources 
available to complete the assigned task (Bulmer 1981). Commissioners on the CCRT had 
a very short timescale to report in: “[ministers] wanted something which would be 
practically focused and to which they would be able to respond fairly quickly (…) they 
wanted this doing in three months, which was pretty tricky” (interview with 
commissioner). This need for speed precluded the creation of a judicial inquiry. When 
asked about this option, a minister concerned explained: “There is no way in which you 
can afford to have an inquiry which some judge might independently decide should last 
for two years, because you needed to respond as quickly as was feasible” (interview 
with minister). 
 
Commissioners on the CIC were more positive. “Level of resources was good, as far as I 
can see. We never felt short of money (...) I don’t remember at any point being told that 
we can’t do that because we can’t afford it.” (interview with commissioner). And there 
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was certainly no rush to produce findings: in contrast to the three months allotted to the 
CCRT, CIC commissioners had a full 12 months in which to complete their work, on top 
of the year-long ‘false start’ noted above. The logic of the delaying tactic was not lost on 
one of the commissioners: “one of the bog-standard explanations of why you have a 
commission is that it kicks things into the long grass long enough for it to be long 
enough down the line, precisely to avoid the immediate high-media scramble” 
(interview with commissioner).  
 
The CMEB was initially financed from generous private sources,7 and was given ample 
time – over two years – to produce a report. However, the ‘false start’ under Sir John 
Burgh meant that there were no funds left to conduct any original research during 
Parekh’s chairmanship, the secretariat had to be reduced to one paid employee and one 
volunteer. The generous timeframe and initially generous funding might suggest a 
desire to produce findings that would be robust and comprehensive. However, the lack 
of urgency and failure to find top-up funding may also point to a legitimising function, 
with Runnymede and the commission’s Labour supporters supporting the idea of an 
authoritative ‘landmark’ commission but less concerned to invest the resources 
necessary to produce actionable findings. 
 
In summary, the CMEB’s resources and duration again suggest that it may have had a 
dual role of both impacting policy, and legitimising its sponsors. In the case of Cantle’s 
report, by contrast, the CCRT appears to have been designed to produce a swift 
response to what was considered an urgent problem – whether in order to fill gaps in 
                                                 
7 Approximately £300,000 to £400,000 was raised through a matched-funding inititative of the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, the Paul Hamlyn Foundation and the Nuffield Foundation. (Interviews with 
commissioners). 
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knowledge, or to substantiate the government’s policy preferences. The slow start 
which the CIC was allowed to make, on the other hand, and the ample resources it 
received thereafter, signal that the commission was set up as a ‘delaying tactic’ by 
ministers, a function we label as ‘legitimising’. 
 
Independence 
 
In ascertaining the independence of each commission, it is useful to look at both their 
initial terms of reference, and the degree of involvement of government in their 
subsequent deliberations. The CMEB was tasked “to analyse the current state of multi-
ethnic Britain and to propose ways of countering racial discrimination … making Britain 
a confident and vibrant multicultural society at ease with its rich diversity” (CMEB 
2000: viii). According to the chair: “The terms of reference were pretty wide ... bearing 
in mind multi-ethnic Britain, where should we be going? Almost anything and 
everything!” (interview with Parekh). 
 
This is not to say that the CMEB’s subsequent autonomy was entirely unconstrained. 
The commission had received the semi-official blessing of the Home Secretary, Jack 
Straw, and a first draft was sent to his office. From the perspective of one commissioner 
not privy to discussions with the Home Office, this could have been merely a matter of 
courtesy: “It’s a reciprocal thing: [ministers] don’t want to be ambushed by something 
which they didn’t anticipate and to which they have to respond very quickly. And 
therefore they appreciate advance sight.” For the chair, sharing drafts was also intended 
to ensure the commission did not misrepresent the government’s thinking:  
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Sometimes a civil servant would write to us wanting to know what we were 
doing, what kinds of policy we were beginning to support. So there was some 
fusion of ideas: they talking to us and we to them. And then when the first draft 
was ready, very tentative, we sent it to the minister, to look at it, to see if there 
were any glaring deficiencies: if we had got something wrong in terms of the 
government’s vision or policy. Just by way of correction, not by way of giving 
their imprimatur: not approval but just correction. (interview with Parekh) 
 
In contrast to the broad remit of the CMEB, the CCRT had far narrower terms, even to 
the point of stipulating which actors should be addressed by commissioners: “to obtain 
the views of local communities, including young people, local authorities and faith 
organisations … on the issues that need to be addressed in developing confident, active 
communities and social cohesion” (CCRT 2001: 5). In the words of one commissioner: 
It was a top-down agenda to a great extent. (…) You know, it’s almost like having 
a table of contents and then going down and saying ‘how do we fill the table of 
contents?’ (…) It was very specifically around community cohesion. They’d 
already decided that, you know, we’d already moved away from 
multiculturalism. 
 
The question which remains, however, is whether the top-down steer was coming from 
the Home Office or from Cantle himself. On this point, the evidence is mixed. Cantle met 
with ministers several times to discuss working drafts, ostensibly because the 
government wished to coincide the release of the CCRT and local reviews with the 
publication of the government’s own response to the various reviews, through the Inter-
Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion. Nonetheless, Cantle was at 
pains to stress the lack of government interference: 
I thought that at some point they were going to perhaps try and constrain what 
we said or inhibit some of the criticisms we were making of government policy. 
But I have to say, not at all: not one single attempt or suggestion that we might 
ameliorate our findings in any way. Which really did unnerve me a bit actually, it 
surprised me. (interview with Cantle) 
 
A minister involved also echoed these sentiments:  
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It wasn't a nurse-maiding approach. There was certainly nothing about no-go 
areas, or nothing about ‘you've got to do so-and-so.’ I can imagine that does 
happen in other types of reviews, but in this one, I think we just struck lucky 
with Ted.   
 
Turning finally to the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, its members were 
asked “to consider how local areas can play a role in forging cohesive and resilient 
communities” (CIC 2007: 17). There was only one topic which informally was off-limits 
for the CIC, according to commissioners: no allusion was to be made linking the 7/7 
bombings to the government’s foreign policy. Other than that, commissioners felt they 
had freedom to explore the issues as they saw fit. This autonomy also extended to the 
drafting of the CIC report, Our Shared Future. Similar to Cantle’s interactions with 
ministers for the CCRT, the chair Darra Singh met regularly with the minister, Ruth 
Kelly, and her special advisers. However, unlike the CCRT, commissioners perceived a 
‘light touch’ approach from ministers, and were at pains to emphasise their 
independence: “I think there was a genuine sense in which the politicians wanted to not 
be involved, for it to be perceived to be independent in large degree. So to that extent, it 
had the necessary amount of support but Ruth Kelly wasn’t all over us” (interview with 
commissioner).  
 
In summary, the CIC had a large degree of independence from government, and what is 
more, ministers were keen for the commission to be so perceived, pointing to a 
legitimising rationale. Regarding the CCRT, the evidence is mixed on whether problem-
solving or substantiating logics were at work: the allusion above to top-down 
interference echoes the suspicions found in existing commentaries (see Robinson 2008: 
17-19). Yet interviews with ministers and Cantle himself point to a more nuanced 
interpretation. Having put considerable thought into the choice of chair, ministers felt 
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reassured that they had the right person for the job, implying there was no need to 
significantly interfere in its deliberations. The CMEB also presents some unexpected 
aspects. Despite being free of direct government control with regard to terms of 
reference, there was nonetheless a degree of Home Office oversight of its drafts. 
Commissioners explained this either as a courtesy to minimise the risk of inadvertently 
embarrassing the government, or to ensure that recommendations were relevant to 
policymakers. These explanations are consistent with the idea that the CMEB may have 
had both legitimising and instrumental functions.  
 
Dissemination 
 
The dissemination indicator refers to a sponsor’s interest in publicising both the 
establishment of a commission, and the outcome of its deliberations. The two 
government-sponsored commissions were launched by high-profile politicians, in 
response to high-profile events. The CCRT was announced by the Home Secretary David 
Blunkett in the House of Commons on July 10, 2001, following a weekend of rioting in 
Bradford. Although a more drawn-out process, the creation of the CIC can be traced 
back to the government response to the 7/7 bombings. The CMEB, although formally 
independent of government, had close ties to the Labour party, and these connections 
were activated when the Home Secretary Jack Straw accepted an invitation to launch 
the commission in January 1998.  
 
As regards dissemination of findings, the dissemination of the CCRT report was 
managed by Cantle in conjunction with the Home Office secretariat attached to the 
Review. It was carefully timed, with a simultaneous governmental response in the form 
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of the inter-ministerial working group report. In the event, Cantle’s report attracted 
considerable coverage, almost certainly boosted by David Blunkett’s decision to pre-
empt an announcement of the findings. Cantle maintained that:  
it didn’t in any way interfere with what we said. (…) I think the problem was 
more that when people from the outside viewed the report they probably 
thought – wrongly – that somehow David Blunkett had had a hand in it and was 
pulling the strings behind the scenes. 
 
Stage-management by New Labour policymakers was also a feature in the 
dissemination of the CIC report, Our Shared Future. In a departure from the other 
commissions considered here, the publication of interim findings some four months 
before the release of the final report indicates the importance that government attached 
to keeping the work of the commission in the public eye. As with the CCRT, a number of 
findings from the final report were leaked in advance by ministers, in this case through 
the launch of a pamphlet on ‘Britishness’ written by Kelly and Liam Byrne for the Fabian 
Society.8 
Thereafter, ministerial special advisers took the lead in briefing the media about 
what the report contained. The press was directed to the particular line that CLG 
wanted to run: “It was simplified, structured, messaged, gobbitted, and handed to the 
journalists on a plate in a digestible form, and they ate it without exception” (interview 
with commissioner). Arguably, the actual content of the dissemination was less 
important than signalling to the public that a thorough and credible inquiry had taken 
place: this legitimising function is evident from the fact that few of the highlighted 
findings were subsequently translated into policy, as the next section will argue.  
 
                                                 
8 Kelly and Byrne (2007) A Common Place, London: The Fabian Society 
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Finally, in the case of the CMEB, pro-active engagement with the media is also a feature, 
but for different reasons again. Given that commissioners were aiming to impact not 
only policy but also public debate, they realised they needed to broadcast their message 
to the wider public. The appointment of a number of prominent journalists as 
commissioners signals that the chair and sponsor had one eye on dissemination from 
the outset, in order “to give us a certain kind of sensitivity to what the public will 
accept” (interview with Parekh). The commission also hired a PR company to manage 
the media strategy. Ultimately, these preparations backfired spectacularly (McLaughlin 
and Neal 2004), as we explore in the next section. 
 
Government Take-up 
 
As we argued earlier, the extent to which policymakers see a commission as 
contributing to policy can change over time, and in unanticipated ways. The CMEB is a 
case in point. At its launch in January 1998, Home Secretary Jack Straw forcefully 
invoked the commission’s problem-solving potential, declaring that it was “setting off 
with a very strong wind. We are going to take it very seriously.”9 Of course, government-
sponsored or –endorsed commissions tend to be launched with such instrumentalist 
platitudes. However, ministers’ attitudes changed once the scale of the hostile media 
reception became apparent. The coverage focused on one short passage in the 417-page 
text: “Britishness … has systematic, largely unspoken, racial connotations” (CMEB 2000: 
38). Mis-construing the word ‘racial’ for ‘racist’, the Daily Telegraph led with a front-
page story which portrayed the CMEB report as a racist slur against the British people. 
This criticism was subsequently reproduced in newspapers across the ideological 
                                                 
9 The Guardian, February 4 1998, p2. 
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spectrum. As a result, the speech which Jack Straw’s aides had prepared in advance of 
his launch of the report had to be re-written at the last minute. The official line, as 
encapsulated in the revised Home Office press release, was that the commissioners 
were not patriotic enough in their assessment of multi-ethnic Britain. The report swiftly 
became a “politically untouchable document” (McLaughlin and Neal 2004: 156), and as 
a result government ministers initially refused to endorse any of its recommendations.  
 
Despite this inauspicious debut, the Parekh Report has proved surprisingly durable and 
influential, leading to adjustments in policy as well as discursive shifts in the terms used 
to debate ethnic diversity in the UK. This influence is attributed, ironically enough, to 
the media furore it created initially: “The [Telegraph coverage] has a counter-intuitively 
productive effect, because rather than everyone saying ‘so what?’ and it just lying dead, 
people actually begin to read it and debate about it” (interview with commissioner). It 
has since been claimed by the Runnymede Trust that more than half of the CMEB’s 
recommendations have been acted upon, including the creation of the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, merging the Commission for Racial Equality and other 
equality watchdogs; the introduction of citizenship ceremonies; better collection of 
ethnicity statistics in schools; and legislation prohibiting discrimination on religious 
grounds. Of equal significance are the reorientations in terminology and discourse 
about ethnic diversity which the report heralded:  
So many things which are now seen as platitudes were introduced by us, when 
we said ‘let us tell the (national) story differently.’ Or putting the whole idea of 
being British, or ‘Britishness’, on the agenda. Everybody now talks about it – no 
one did before the report. (interview with commissioner) 
 
The Cantle report likewise introduced a new set of terms to the integration and 
diversity debate, focused on the concept of community cohesion. In contrast to the 
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CMEB however, ministers’ views of the CCRT were very positive, with John Denham 
stating in the government’s immediate official response: “The Community Cohesion 
Review Team have been enormously helpful in shaping our proposals for action by 
Government. The team has identified many important issues, and their report contains a 
wealth of valuable description and analysis” (Home Office 2001: 1). Recommendations 
which government took up included citizenship ceremonies10 and more resources going 
to cross-cultural initiatives in schools. A recommendation to set a minimum 25 percent 
quota for non-denominational pupils in faith schools was eventually watered down to 
instituting a statutory duty on schools to promote community cohesion. More broadly, 
‘community cohesion’ became a central aim of overall government policy, with 
considerable resources directed at it. As the chair recollected:  
There was a willingness to carry through the report. [The Home Office] set up a 
Community Cohesion Unit, which was a civil servants’ team to support us. And 
we then created quite an enormous web of people … who could help us translate 
the findings into what was happening in schools or housing or wherever 
(interview with Cantle).  
 
The Cantle report is widely viewed as ‘paradigm-shifting’, signalling an end to 
multiculturalist discourses about valuing difference and moving to the community 
cohesion approach which promotes ‘shared’ values. “[The CCRT] was one of the 
significant factors in the reappraisal of multiculturalism as it had previously been. (…) 
It's one of those landmark reports that began a change in thinking about how you do 
this” (interview with minister). As we saw, though, the concept of social cohesion was 
built into the commission’s terms of reference: what the report did was to put flesh on 
the bones of an idea already being embraced by senior officials and Labour politicians. 
 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, this recommendation was first introduced in the Parekh report, but only gained 
acceptance  from government when proposed by the CCRT. 
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By contrast, the CIC report disappeared from the agenda rather quickly, following the 
brief flurry of stage-managed media interest. Four months had elapsed before the CLG 
minister responded to Our Shared Future, in a letter to the Chair Darra Singh. The only 
substantive message contained therein was the announcement that funding for local 
authorities’ cohesion-building activities would be significantly increased, from £2 
million to £50 million, although with few indications about how that money would be 
spent. A further four months passed before the government’s formal response emerged 
(CLG 2008). Although a substantial document of 50 pages, much of its content focused 
on policies that other ministries had developed to promote community cohesion. 
Guidance for Local Authorities was also promised. Regarding the headline 
recommendations of the report, however, little of consequence was delivered. The CIC’s 
flagship proposal for an Integration Agency funded by central government was dropped 
following a feasibility study in June 2008. One commissioner summed up the CLG stance 
as being initially “eulogistic” about the report, but then not doing very much to follow it 
up. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Independent commissions can serve a range of purposes for governments. While most 
literature focuses on their problem-solving function, we have argued that such bodies 
are also likely to play important symbolic functions, helping substantiate particular 
policy preferences, or legitimising a sponsoring agency by signalling its willingness or 
capacity to address a problem. The three commissions examined in this paper display 
elements of each of these three functions.  
 
  
25 
The CCRT appears to have been set up primarily to flesh out government ideas about 
supporting “community cohesion”. The choice of a “safe officer” as chair, the closely 
proscribed terms of reference and swift reporting, and the close interaction with 
ministers and officials throughout, strongly suggest it had a substantiating function, 
designed to bolster support for the new paradigm. However, it clearly went further than 
simply backing up pre-given ideas. In elaborating the concept of community cohesion, 
the commission set out a number of detailed recommendations which went beyond 
government thinking, which had a significant impact on policy. In this sense, the CCRT 
appears to have combined features of substantiating and problem-solving functions. 
 
The CIC, by contrast, appears to conform fairly closely to the “legitimising” type 
identified in the paper. Its protracted launch and deliberations, its wide and shifting 
remit, and the lack of attention to its findings, suggest that its substantive 
recommendations were not of particular interest to policymakers. At the same time, the 
resources invested in publicising its launch and findings imply the government was 
keen to signal to the media and public that it was taking action to address the big 
questions around faith and community cohesion which the London bombings had 
highlighted. Ultimately, the government never had a very clear idea of what exactly it 
wanted from the commission by way of findings, reflected also in the subsequent lack of 
take-up of the commission’s recommendations.  
 
Turning to the CMEB, the composition, resources and degree of independence of the 
commission all suggest that its role was partly instrumental, partly legitimising. Its 
sponsors certainly intended it to influence policy. But both Runnymede and the 
commission’s Labour advocates also appear to have been interested in highlighting 
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their involvement with an eminent and potentially landmark report on multicultural 
Britain. The CMEB offers a fascinating example of how such intentions can become 
derailed: highly critical media attention forced the government to distance itself from 
the commission, at least initially. Nonetheless, the CMEB arguably had a profound affect 
on public debate and policy in the medium to long-term, thus representing a case of 
Weiss’ “enlightenment” function of knowledge, which we classify as a form of 
instrumental knowledge utilization. 
 
Beyond these specific findings, the analysis also shows how the function of commissions 
can change over time, in ways that are not always anticipated (Resodihardjo 2006). This 
was most clearly the case with the CMEB, with its rapid fall from grace following 
negative media reporting. But arguably it is also true in the case of the CCRT, whose 
impact on policy appears to have gone beyond what was expected – thus implying that 
an initially substantiating function evolved into a problem-solving one. Finally, our 
cases support the insight that policy change is unlikely to be based on bold new ideas 
developed outside government. It is far more likely to involve incremental adjustments, 
which broadly cohere with the beliefs and goals already espoused by policymakers. In 
this sense, commissions may have most impact on policy precisely when they are 
performing a combination of substantiating and instrumental functions: as in the case of 
the CCRT, such bodies have understood and embraced the priorities and objectives of 
policymakers, and see their job as further developing policy along those lines. 
Alternatively, as in the case of the CMEB, they may propose more radical ideas which 
are not necessarily in line with existing government preferences; but in that case, it is 
likely to take longer for their ideas to seep through and influence policymaking.  
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Table 1.  Indicators of the functions of independent commissions 
 
 
 Instrumental Substantiating Legitimising 
 
Composition 
 
Relevant expertise 
(academic or 
practitioner) 
 
 
Trusted by 
government 
 
Recognised as 
authoritative 
Resources/ 
timeframe 
Adequate to ensure 
valid findings 
 
Adequate to produce 
desired results 
Adequate to signal 
thorough review 
Independence Moderate, to allow 
valid findings but 
ensure relevance 
 
Low, to ensure 
desired results 
Moderate to High, to 
signal credibility of 
commission 
Dissemination Less important Very important, 
targeted to persuade 
audience 
 
Very important, 
targeted to signal 
authority 
Government  
take-up 
Findings used to 
adjust policy, if 
deemed useful 
Findings used to back 
preferred action 
Findings not directly 
used (may lead to 
longer-term 
‘enlightenment’) 
